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What’s Wrong with Litigation-Driven Science?
An Essay in Legal Epistemology
Susan Haack ∗

If Science, for a consideration, can be induced to prove anything
which a party litigant needs in order to sustain his side of the issue, then Science is fairly open to the charge of venality and perjury, rendered the more base by the disguise of natural truth in
which she robes herself.

John Ordronaux

1

I.

INTRODUCTION

Jeremy Bentham’s memorable description of “Injustice and
2
her handmaid, Falsehood” should remind us, if we need reminding,
3
that factual truth is an important element of justice, that it really
matters whether this witness’s recovered memory of an alleged crime
is genuine, whether this is the person who committed the crime,
whether this plaintiff’s injury was caused by a defect in this manufacturer’s tire or seat-belt buckle or lawn-chair, whether this was the
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John Ordronaux, On Expert Testimony in Judicial Proceedings, 30 AM. J. INSANITY
312, 312 (1874).
2
1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 22 (Garland Publishing
Inc. 1978) (1827).
3
An important element of substantive justice, that is—with which considerations
of procedural justice in some instances compete: e.g., when a person who committed
a crime goes unpunished, or a person who suffered an injury goes uncompensated,
for lack of admissible evidence making the case to the required degree of proof.
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chemical exposure that caused or promoted the plaintiff’s cancer,
4
and so on.
Because the factual truths at issue in a case often go beyond what
the average juror can be expected to know, courts have come increasingly to rely on expert witnesses, among them scientists testifying on
just about every subject imaginable: experts on blood, bullets, bitemarks, battered wives; on PCBs, paternity, poisons, post-traumatic
stress; on radon, recovered memories, rape trauma syndrome, random-match probabilities; on psychosis, asbestosis, silicosis (and for all
I know, on psittacosis!). But as long as courts have relied significantly
on scientific witnesses, there have been complaints: about the scientific ignorance and gullibility of attorneys, judges, and jurors; about
“witness-shopping”; and—as my opening quotation illustrates—about
the irresponsibility and venality of professional scientific experts willing to say whatever is needed to advance the cause of the party that
hires them.
As reliance on expert witnesses has grown, so has the felt need
for courts to ensure that the expert testimony admitted is not just
flimsy or interested speculation, but reliable enough to be more helpful than misleading; and one factor that courts have sometimes taken
as indicating that proffered scientific testimony may not be reliable is
that it is based on “litigation-driven” science. As it happens, the context in which I first encountered criticisms of proffered scientific testimony as “litigation-driven” was Judge Kozinski’s 1995 ruling in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., on remand from the Su5
preme Court. As I subsequently discovered, however, that expert testimony is based on litigation-driven research has been construed not

4
This principle has, however, sometimes been deliberately sidestepped in civil
cases; see, e.g., Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1948), where the court held that:
where a group of persons are on a hunting party, or otherwise engaged
in the use of firearms, and two of them are negligent in firing in the direction of a third person who is injured thereby, both of those so firing
are liable for the injury . . . although the negligence of only one of
them could have caused [it].
Id.; Sindell v. Abbott Labs, 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980) (holding that “[e]ach defendant will be held liable for the proportion of the judgment represented by its
share of that market unless it demonstrates that it could not have made the product
which caused plaintiff’s injuries”); and, most strikingly, Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
539 N.E.2d 1069, 1081 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that “there should be no exculpation for
a defendant who, although a member of the market producing DES [diethylstilbestrol] for pregnancy use, appears not to have caused a particular plaintiff’s injury”).
5
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert IV), 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir.
1995).
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only as bearing on its admissibility, but also as lowering its weight;
and has been construed as bearing on the admissibility of scientific
7
8
testimony under Frye v. United States as well as under Daubert.
This prompts a host of questions, legal and epistemological,
theoretical and practical. What role has this factor played in courts’
handling of scientific testimony? What exactly does it mean to describe research as “litigation-driven”? What reasons have courts given
for regarding litigation-driven science with suspicion? Are these reasons sound? And if they are, does this suffice to show that Judge Kozinski’s new “Daubert factor”—whether the science on which testimony
is based is litigation-driven—is a useful indicator of the (un)reliability
of proffered expert testimony?
Part II of this Article will look in some detail at two Bendectin
cases: Daubert itself, which I’m sure I don’t need to tell you was a federal case tried first in 1989 under Frye, but reheard by the U.S. Court
of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit on remand from the Supreme Court
of the United States under the new standards of admissibility the Su6

See, e.g., Perry v. United States, 755 F.2d 888, 892 (1985) (“[Plaintiff’s expert
witness] Dr. Goldfield had reached a conclusion as to the connection between encephalitis and the [swine flu] vaccine before commencing his research.”). The
Court cited similar criticism of Dr. Goldfield’s testimony in O’Gara v. United States,
560 F. Supp. 786, 790 (E.D. Pa. 1983), and in Robinson v. United States, 533 F. Supp.
320, 328 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
7
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see, e.g., Lofgren v. Motorola, No. CV93-05521, 1988 WL 2999925, at *32 (Ariz. Super. June 1, 1988) (excluding the testimony of plaintiff’s expert witness Dr. Kilburn that the injuries were
caused by a single exposure to Rubiflex, in part on the grounds that “the conclusion
appeared to be more litigation-driven than science oriented”).
8
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert III), 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993);
see, e.g., Burleson v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 393 F.3d 577, 584 (5th Cir. 2004)
(“Dr. Carlson’s ‘radiation hot-spot’ theory is nothing more than litigation-driven
speculation, not science.”); Prohaska v. Sofamor, 138 F. Supp. 2d 422, 437 (W.D.N.Y.
2001) (Dr. Austin’s testimony that pedicle screws manufactured by the defendant
were defective excluded because “litigation-driven expertise has been found to be a
negative factor in admissibility”); Downs v. Prestorp Components, Inc., 126 F. Supp.
2d 1090, 1094, 1129 (E.D. Tenn. 1999) (excluding Dr. Kilburn’s testimony because it
“appeared to be more litigation-driven than science oriented” and is “based upon
nothing more than conjecture, speculation, and litigation animus”) (internal citations omitted)); Mancuso v. Consol. Edison, 967 F. Supp. 1437, 1445 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(Dr. Schwartz’s testimony that PCB exposure caused Mr. Mancuso’s ailments inadmissible because he “rel[ied] upon plaintiff’s attorney to provide him with the scientific literature”); Celotex Corp. v. AIU Ins. Co., 196 B.R. 973, 984–85 (Bankr. M.D.
Pa. 1996) (“[T]he ‘scientific’ evidence regarding asbestos . . . in buildings . . .
[seems] more litigation driven than science driven.”); Nelson v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline
Co., No 95-1112, 1998 WL 1297690, at *8, *13 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 31, 1998) (excluding Dr. Kilburn’s testimony partly on the grounds that his study “was performed in
connection with litigation and funded by plaintiffs’ counsel,” and Dr. Hirsch’s partly
on the grounds of his “failure to have . . . conducted prelitigation research”).
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9

preme Court had set in 1993; and a less famous case, Blum v. Merrell
Dow, from a Frye state (Pennsylvania) which began, before Daubert, in
10
1982, but didn’t come to a final resolution until 2000. In both cases
we find expert opinion criticized as based on “litigation-driven science”—though in Daubert this criticism was directed at the reliability
of the plaintiff’s experts’ testimony, while in Blum it was directed at
the legitimacy of the “scientific consensus” to which the defendants’
experts appealed; and both Judge Kozinski (in Daubert) and Judge
Bernstein (in Blum) tried to articulate why litigation-driven science is
apt to be less dependable than independently-conducted research.
Part III will explain the distinction between inquiry and advocacy
and explore the differences between investigation, plain and simple,
and advocacy research; and then clear up an ambiguity in “litigationdriven” and some uncertainties in “reliable.” This analysis will reveal
that research that is litigation-driven in the stronger of the two senses
distinguished is inherently in danger of bias; and in consequence is
inherently less likely to be—at least in one understanding of that
somewhat elusive concept—evidentially reliable.
This, in turn, will suggest some conclusions, articulated in Part
IV. There is some truth, as both Judge Kozinski and Judge Bernstein
argue, in the idea that the fact that science is litigation-driven indicates that it is more likely to be unreliable. But there is something
not quite right about Judge Kozinski’s arguments for this conclusion;
and the flaws in his arguments reveal that his new Daubert factor is
not, after all, as helpful as he hopes, or as it might initially seem. This
diagnosis leads to some disturbing thoughts about how scientific work
can be distorted and impeded when it gets entangled with litigation,
and some hard questions about these interactions of science with the
law.
II. A LEGAL THICKET:
THE TANGLED TALE OF DAUBERT AND BLUM
In Frye v. United States, in excluding the results of a then-new
blood-pressure lie-detector test, the D.C. Court of Appeals had ruled
that novel scientific testimony is admissible only if the “scientific
9
Daubert III, 509 U.S. 579; see also Daubert IV, 43 F.3d at 1311; Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert II), 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991); Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert I), 727 F.Supp. 570 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
10
Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 1 Pa. D. & C.4th 634 (Ct. Comm. Pleas Pa.
1988), rev’d, 560 A.2d 212 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), aff’d, 626 A.2d 537 (Pa. 1993), remanded to 33 Phila. Co. Rptr. 193 (Ct. Comm. Pleas Pa. 1996), rev’d, 705 A.2d
1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997), aff’d, sub nom. Blum ex rel. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,
Inc., 747 A.2d 877 (2000).
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principle or discovery” from which it is deduced is “sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
11
which it belongs.” For a decade, Frye wasn’t cited even once, and in
its first quarter-century it was cited only a dozen or so times; but by
the early 1980s it was being cited over and over, and was “probably
12
the ‘majority rule’” in the country.
The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), enacted in 1975, provided
in Rule 702 that expert testimony is admissible if it is relevant and not
legally excluded under Rule 403 on grounds of prejudice, waste of
13
time, or confusing or misleading the jury. Because Rule 702 said
nothing about general acceptance, it provoked debate among legal
scholars about whether the Federal Rules had or hadn’t superseded
Frye. By the late 1980s, there was a burgeoning concern with reliability. By 1991, the publication of Peter Huber’s Galileo’s Revenge: Junk
Science in the Courtroom was fueling fears that flimsy, interested, wildly
speculative science was flooding the courts; the same year, some
judges on the Federal Rules Advisory Committee sought to change
the FRE to include a reliability requirement. By 1992, the first Bush
14
administration was urging similar changes. These initiatives were
preempted, however, by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Daubert.
***
While pregnant, Mrs. Daubert had taken Bendectin for morning
sickness (which, though often just a nuisance, may be serious enough
15
to require hospitalization—and can be fatal). Her baby, Jason, was
born with severe birth defects. Coming to suspect that Bendectin was
the cause, in 1989 the Dauberts brought suit against Merrell Dow

11

Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
See Paul C. Giannelli, Frye v. United States: Background Paper Prepared for the National Conference of Lawyers and Scientists, 99 F.R.D. 189, 196 (1983).
13
FED. R. EVID. 702.
14
See Michael H. Gottesman, From Barefoot to Daubert to Joiner: Triple Play or
Double Error?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 757–59 (1998) (citing Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 73, 156 (1991) (proposal of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee); Dan Quayle, Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 997,
999 (1992) (proposal of the President’s Competitiveness Committee)).
15
See, e.g., American Pregnancy Association, Morning Sickness, http://www.americ
anpreganancy.org/preganancyhealth/morningsickness.html (last visited Aug. 9,
2007); American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Morning Sickness, http:
//www.acog.org/publications/patient_education/bp126.cfm (last visited Aug. 9,
2007).
12
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16

Pharmaceuticals, the manufacturer of the drug. The company had
taken Bendectin off the market in 1983, shortly after the first reports
appeared of children with limb defects being born to women who
17
had taken the drug —though the company maintained that the withdrawal was not prompted by the alleged dangers, but by the potential
18
costs of litigation. (The chemically identical drug is still on sale, by
19
a different company and under a different name, in Canada. )
The Dauberts proffered experts to testify that their re-analyses of
the existing data showed a statistical link between Bendectin and
limb-reduction birth defects; that Bendectin causes birth defects in
laboratory animals, and so probably causes them in humans too; and
that Bendectin is chemically similar to other drugs suspected of caus20
ing such defects. Merrell Dow’s attorneys presented evidence that
no clinical trial had ever been published that showed Bendectin to be
21
teratogenic; that despite a wave of Bendectin litigation the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) had continued to approve the drug
for use by pregnant women, because “available data do not demon22
strate an association between birth defects and Bendectin;” and that
23
the consensus among medical scientists was that the drug was safe.
16

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert IV), 43 F.3d 1311, 1313 (9th Cir.
1995).
17
Gottesman, supra note 14, at 767.
18
Astara March, Drug Revived to Fight Morning Sickness, NURSE WEEK, Oct. 11, 2000,
http://www.nurseweek.com/news/00-10/1011morn.asp.
19
Duchesnay Inc. sells the drug under the name “Diclectin” in Canada, and is
seeking FDA approval to sell it in the U.S. Diclectin, http://www.diclectin.com/
index.html (last visited Jul. 26, 2007). At an FDA/NIH conference held on Dec. 4,
2000, Dr. Gideon Koren of the University of Toronto asked “How safe is safe?” and
answered that while in the first meta-analysis, conducted in Toronto, there were
130,000 case controls, and an odds ratio of 1.0, “there was a confidence interval going to 155, which means we cannot say for sure that there isn’t a 55 percent increased risk.” Interface of Clinical Pharmacology and Drug Safety at FDA/NIH Conference, (Dec. 4, 2000), http://www.fda.gov/cder/present/clinpharm2000/1204preg.
txt (last visited Jul. 30, 2007). So far as I have been able to determine, as of August
2007, Diclectin had not been approved in the U.S.
20
Daubert IV, 43 F.3d at 1314.
21
A teratogen (from the Greek word, tera, meaning “monster”) is a substance
that causes birth defects.
22
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. News, No. P80-45 (Oct. 7, 1980). The
ruling in Daubert IV ends the quotation here; however, it continues “[Bendectin]
should be used only when conservative treatment fails.” Joseph Sanders, From Science
to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 7
(1993). According to the FDA Orange Book Detail Record, “[Bendectin] was
not discontinued or withdrawn for safety or efficacy reasons.” Drugs@FDA, http://
www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/docs/obdetail.cfm?Appl_No=010598&TAB
(last visited Jul. 31, 2007).
23
Daubert IV, 43 F.3d at 1314.
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Before Daubert, the Frye Rule had been used almost exclusively in
24
criminal cases. Unusually, however, in Daubert the trial court (citing
25
U.S. v. Kilgus and Barrel of Fun v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.) had
relied significantly on Frye in ruling the plaintiffs’ expert evidence inadmissible. The Dauberts’ proffered scientific testimony was not, as
the Frye standard requires, generally accepted in the field to which it
belongs; for, the court continues, this would require that there be sta26
tistically significant epidemiological evidence of causation, but
“none of the published studies show a statistically significant associa27
tion between the use of Bendectin and birth defects.” So the trial
court granted Merrell Dow summary judgment; and in 1991 (citing
U.S. v. Solomon), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit af28
firmed.
Because of the trial court’s almost unprecedented reliance on
Frye, the key issue as Daubert came before the Supreme Court in 1993
was whether the Federal Rules had or hadn’t superseded the older
rule. Holding that they had, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. At the same time, however, the Court (re)interpreted FRE
702 as requiring courts to screen proffered scientific testimony not
only for relevance, as the Rule explicitly required, but also for reliability; and provided a “flexible list” of indicia that might be considered in assessing whether such testimony was reliable enough to be

24

So when Peter Huber argued that Frye had helped keep junk science out of tort
cases before the Federal Rules of Evidence relaxed the standards of admissibility, he
misrepresented the relevant legal history. See PETER HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK
SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM, 14–17, 41, 150, 176–77, 199–201, 204 (1993); Peter
Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom, 26 VAL. L. REV. 723 (1992); see also Kenneth J.
Cheseboro, Galileo’s Retort: Peter Huber’s Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1637, 1687–
96 (1994).
25
Kilgus was a criminal case in which testimony identifying the defendant’s aircraft using a “forward looking infrared system” had been excluded under Frye.
United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[A] necessary predicate
to the admission of scientific evidence is that the principle on which it is based ‘must
be sufficiently established to have general acceptance in the field to which it belongs.’”) (quoting United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 546 (6th Cir. 1977)). Barrel
of Fun was a fire-insurance fraud case in which polygraph testimony had been excluded under Frye; so far as I know, it was the only civil case before Daubert I which
had relied on Frye. Barrel of Fun v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 739 F.2d 1028 (5th
Cir. 1984).
26
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert I), 727 F.Supp. 570, 573 (S.D.
Cal. 1989).
27
Id. at 575.
28
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert II), 951 F.2d 1128, 1129–30 (9th
Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522, 1526 (9th Cir. 1985)).
Solomon was a murder case in which the higher court affirmed the trial court’s exclusion, under Frye, of evidence concerning narcoanalysis.
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admissible: whether the proffered testimony “can be (and has been)
tested; the known or potential error rate;” whether the evidence has
been subject to scrutiny by way of “peer review and publication”; and
(in a nod to Frye) whether it is generally accepted in the field to
29
which it belongs.
Rehearing the case on remand, in a memorable passage that
30
would soon be much cited by judges and legal commentators, Judge
Kozinski wrote of the formidable task the Supreme Court had set for
him and his colleagues on the federal bench:
Federal judges ruling on the admissibility of expert scientific
testimony face a far more complex and daunting task in a postDaubert world than before. . . . [T]hough we are largely untrained in science and certainly no match for any of the witnesses
whose testimony we are reviewing, it is our responsibility to determine whether those experts’ proposed testimony amounts to
“scientific knowledge,” constitutes “good science,” and was derived by the “scientific method.” . . . [W]e take a deep breath and
31
proceed with this heady task.

The Daubert Court, he noted, had not supplied a “definitive checklist”
of indicia of reliability, only an illustrative list of the factors to which
32
courts might look; but this list raised some tricky questions:
[H]ow do we determine whether the rate of error is acceptable,
and by what standard? . . . [W]hat should we infer from the fact
that the methodology has been tested, but only by the party’s own
expert . . . ? Do we ask whether the methodology they employ to
test their methodology is itself methodologically sound? . . . [T]he
29

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert III), 509 U.S. 579, 593–94
(1993).
30
See, e.g., Sofia Adrogue, The Post-Daubert Court: “Amateur Scientist” Gatekeeper or
Executioner?, 35 HOUS. L. REV., 10, 10 (1998); Mark S. Brodin, Behavioral Science Evidence in the Age of Daubert: Reflections of a Skeptic, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 862, 867 (2005);
Judge Harvey Brown, Eight Gates for Expert Witnesses, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 743, 784 (1999);
Lee Epstein & Gary King, Empirical Research and the Goals of Legal Scholarship: The Rules
of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 133 (2002); David L. Faigman, The Law’s Scientific
Revolution: Reflections and Ruminations on the Law’s Use of Experts in Year Seven of the
Revolution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 661, 684 (2000); G. Michael Fenner, The Daubert
Handbook: The Case, Its Essential Dilemma, and Its Progeny, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939,
1066–67 (1996); Robert J. Goodwin, The Hidden Significance of Kumho Tire v. Carmichael: A Compass for Problems of Definition and Procedure Created by Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 603, 646 n.60 (2000).
31
Daubert IV, 43 F.3d at 1315–16.
32
As the Court confirmed in Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 138 (1999):
“A trial judge determining the admissibility of an engineer’s testimony may consider
one or more of the specific Daubert factors. The emphasis on the word ‘may’ reflects
Daubert’s description of the Rule 702 inquiry as ‘a flexible one.’” (quoting Daubert III,
509 U.S. at 594).
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basic problem . . . is that we must devise standards for acceptability where respected scientists disagree on what’s acceptable. 33

Reviewing the Supreme Court’s flexible list of indicia of reliability, Judge Kozinski proposes a new “Daubert factor” of his own:
whether the proffered expert testimony is based on work undertaken
in the normal course of scientific business, or on work conducted
specifically for the purposes of litigation. He stresses the likely flaws
and failings of litigation-driven science:
One very significant fact to be considered is whether the experts
are proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of research they have conducted independent of the
litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions expressly for the purpose of testifying. That an expert testifies for
money does not necessarily cast doubt on the reliability of his testimony, as few experts appear in court merely as an eleemosynary
gesture. But in determining whether proposed expert testimony
amounts to good science, we may not ignore the fact that a scientist’s normal workplace is the lab or the field, not the courtroom
34
or the lawyer’s office.

Referring to Huber’s Galileo’s Revenge, Judge Kozinski suggests
that the fact that an expert testifies on the basis of work he has conducted independent of litigation “provides important, objective proof
35
that the research comports with the dictates of good science”; and
that the fact that research is litigation-driven is an indication that it
may not comport with those dictates. In this context he cites Judge
Johnson’s ruling in Perry: “the examination of a scientific study by a
cadre of lawyers is not the same as its examination by others trained
36
in the field of science or medicine.”
Judge Kozinski gives two main reasons why science conducted
independently of the needs of litigation is more likely to be reliable
than litigation-driven science:
[a] [E]xperts whose findings flow from existing research are less
likely to have been biased toward a particular conclusion by the
promise of remuneration . . . .

33

Daubert IV, 43 F.3d at 1316–17 n.3.
Id. at 1317 (footnote omitted).
35
Id.
36
Id. at 1318 n.8 (citing Perry v. United States, 755 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir.
1985)). Now, of course, this stress on the important differences between in-court
“testing” by cross-examination and testing in the sciences will bring to mind Judge
Pollak’s comments about fingerprint identification. United States v. Llera-Plaza, No.
98-362-10, 2002 WL 27305, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002).
34
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[b] [I]ndependent research carries its own indicia of reliability, as
it is conducted . . . in the usual course of business and must normally satisfy a variety of standards to attract funding and institutional support. 37

Referring again to Huber’s book, Judge Kozinski suggests that
proffered scientific testimony that is not based on research inde38
pendent of litigation requires some other indication of reliability;
specifically, he suggests, had their work been subjected to peer review
and publication, this would provide some assurance that the plaintiffs’ experts’ research was in accordance with the scientific method,
as understood by at least a minority of the relevant scientific community. But not only had the plaintiffs’ proffered experts conducted
their work for the purposes of litigation; not one of them had published his Bendectin research in peer-reviewed journals, as they had
their other scientific work. Given that their findings would surely be
of interest to the scientific community, Judge Kozinski continues, the
fact that they had been unable or unwilling to publish them undermines the idea that these results are, as the Daubert standards re39
quired, “grounded in the methods and procedures of science.”
In a startling but tantalizingly brief footnote to which we shall
have to return in due course, he adds that “[t]here are, of course, exceptions”—kinds of litigation-driven science of which, he believes,
40
there is no reason to be skeptical. Some forensic sciences, such as
fingerprinting or DNA identification techniques, “have the courtroom as a principal theater of operations”; but here the fact that an
expert has developed an expertise primarily for purposes of litigation
41
“will obviously [sic] not be a substantial consideration.” (As we shall
see later, however, really this is far from obvious.)
Early in his ruling, Judge Kozinski had observed that “apart from
a small but determined group of scientists testifying on behalf of the
Bendectin plaintiffs in this and many other cases, there doesn’t appear to be a scientist who has concluded that Bendectin causes limb42
reduction defects”; under Frye, which had been the law of the circuit
at the time when the Dauberts’ experts submitted their affidavits,
their testimony would certainly have to be excluded. However, given

37

Daubert IV, 43 F.3d at 1317.
Id. at 1316–17.
39
Id. at 1318 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert III), 509 U.S.
579, 589–90 (1993)).
40
Id. at 1317 n.5.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 1314.
38
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that the law had changed in the meantime, they might have been
given an opportunity to submit additional proof that their proffered
evidence was, as required by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Daubert,
“derived by the scientific method”—but for the fact, Judge Kozinski
argues, that it was already clear this wouldn’t change the outcome:
the Dauberts’ proffered expert testimony would clearly have to be ex43
cluded under the new standards, as it was under the old.
Surprisingly, however, Judge Kozinski’s reasoning to this conclusion makes little use of the idea that litigation-driven science is especially suspect. In fact—despite his mock-modest announcement at
the outset that he will “take a deep breath and proceed with [the]
44
heady task” of assessing the reliability of the proffered science —it
leaves scientific issues essentially untouched. Moreover, it calls on
the reliability prong of Daubert with respect to only one of the plaintiffs’ experts, Dr. Palmer—the only proffered expert who would testify that Bendectin actually did cause Jason Daubert’s birth defects,
rather than that it could possibly have caused them; and the fact that
Dr. Palmer’s research was litigation-driven plays no specific role in
Judge Kozinski’s argument why it would have to be excluded, which is
simply that “Dr. Palmer offers no tested or testable theory to explain
how . . . he was able to eliminate all other potential causes of birth
45
The other proffered experts, who would speak in
defects . . . .”
terms of probabilities, would have to be excluded under the relevance prong; for none of them even claimed to show, as required,
46
that Bendectin more than doubles the risk of such defects.
***
Like Mrs. Daubert, Mrs Blum took Bendectin for morningsickness; like Jason Daubert, Jeffrey Blum was born with severe defects—in his case, clubbed feet; like the Dauberts, the Blums believed
Bendectin was the cause. In 1982, seven years before the Dauberts’
suit, Jeffrey Blum’s parents brought suit against Merrell Dow; and the
case slowly wound its way through the Pennsylvania courts for eighteen years before being finally resolved, years after Daubert, in 2000.
43

Daubert IV, 43 F.3d at 1319–20.
Id. at 1316.
45
Id. at 1319.
46
Id. at 1320–21 (“California tort law requires that . . . plaintiffs must establish
not just that their mothers’ ingestion of Bendectin increased somewhat the likelihood of birth defects, but that it more than doubled it. . . . None of the plaintiffs’
epidemiological experts claims that the ingestion of Bendectin during pregnancy
more than doubles the risk of birth defects.”); see also, Sanders, supra note 22, at 16
n.63, on this standard for proof of specific causation.
44
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The first trial ended in 1988 with a jury verdict for the plain47
tiffs. Merrell Dow appealed, on the grounds that the verdict had
been reached by only eleven jurors (the twelfth had fallen ill part-way
48
through the trial); and in 1993 was granted a new trial. On remand,
in 1996 the Court of Common Pleas again entered judgment on jury
verdict for the plaintiffs (this time with the full complement of ju49
rors). Merrell Dow appealed again, this time on the grounds that
the plaintiffs’ scientific testimony should have been excluded by the
court; the jury—on the vital importance of which they had earlier insisted—should never have been allowed to hear it. In 1997, the Superior Court held that plaintiffs’ expert testimony regarding the
causal link between Bendectin and birth defects was not admissible
under Frye, and remanded the case “with instructions to the trial
50
court to enter” judgment n.o.v. in favor of Merrell Dow. In 1999,
51
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted allocatur to consider
whether the Frye rule still governed the admissibility of expert scientific testimony in Pennsylvania, or had been superseded by Daubert.
52
In 2000, declining to replace Frye by what it took to be the more relaxed standards of Daubert, but arguing that the Blums’ expert testimony was inadmissible under either standard, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Superior Court in favor of
53
the defendant manufacturer.
While Merrell Dow had maintained that the plaintiffs’ proffered
expert scientific testimony should have been excluded because it
wasn’t generally accepted in the scientific community, the Blums’ at-

47
Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 1 Pa. D. & C.4th 634, 635 (Ct. Comm. Pleas
Pa. 1988).
48
Blum ex. rel. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 626 A.2d 537, 549 (Pa. 1993).
49
Blum ex rel. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 33 Phila. Co. Rptr. 193, 243
(Ct. Comm. Pleas Pa. 1996), rev’d, 705 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997), aff’d, 764
A.2d 1 (Pa. 2000).
50
Blum ex. rel. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 705 A.2d 1314, 1325 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997), aff’d, 764 A.2d 1 (Pa. 2000).
51
10 TIMOTHY P. WILE & MARC A. WERLINSKY, WEST’S PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE § 30:53 (2006–07 ed.) (explaining that “[a]nother
name for allowance of appeal is allocatur”).
52
The Supreme Court's rhetoric had described the Frye Rule as an “austere standard” which the Federal Rules had relaxed. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.
Daubert III), 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). Other states besides Pennsylvania—Florida,
for one—also took this rhetoric at face value. Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 271–72
(Fla. 1997) (“[d]espite the federal adoption of a more lenient standard . . . we [Florida] have maintained the higher standard of reliability as dictated by Frye.”). In practice, however, Daubert standards have arguably proven significantly more restrictive
than the old Frye rule.
53
Blum ex rel. Blum, 764 A.2d at 4–5.
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torneys had argued that Merrell Dow’s expert testimony should have
been excluded because the supposed “scientific consensus” on this
matter was completely artificial; it had been created by the defendant
manufacturer’s support of favorable research and of questionable
peer-reviewed journals that would publish results helpful to the company in defending itself against Bendectin litigation. Dissenting in
part from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s final disposition of the
case in favor of Merrell Dow, Justice Castille summed up the issue:
[I]n the litigation-driven Bendectin “scientific community” described to the court in this case, the notion of “general acceptance” or scientific “orthodoxy”. . . on the question of causation
was a questionable proposition to begin with . . . because the trial
court had heard extensive evidence concerning Merrell Dow’s active and deliberate role, motivated by its litigation interests . . ., in
actually creating and influencing the scientific orthodoxy that
would then operate to suppress any contrary opinion that might
54
harm its Bendectin litigation . . . .

Justice Castille refers us to Judge Bernstein’s ruling at the second
trial.
This ruling—the tone of which is, to say the least, unusually impassioned—opens with a remarkable excerpt from the testimony of
James Newberne, Merrell Dow’s Vice-President for Drug Safety:
Q: Sir, it has been the pattern and practice and custom of the
Merrell Company, in reporting to the FDA, to pick and choose selective information over the past thirty years, relating to the drug
Bendectin, correct?
A: Yes, that’s correct. 55

Judge Bernstein first summarizes the testimony of the Blums’
expert witnesses (including some who had been unsuccessfully prof56
fered by the Dauberts), and then subjects the testimony given by
Merrell Dow’s experts to devastating scrutiny.
Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Gross testified that a review of Merrell
Dow’s animal testing revealed that there were significant numbers of
abnormalities, including club limbs, that had not been reported to

54

Id. at 7–8 (Castille, J., dissenting). Justice Castille later returned to the issue,
citing his own dissenting opinion in Blum in his concurring opinion in Grady v. FritoLay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038, 1048 (Pa. 2003) (Castille, J., concurring).
55
Blum ex rel. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 33 Phila. Co. Rptr. 193, 194
(Ct. Comm. Pleas Pa. 1996), rev’d, 705 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997), aff’d, 764
A.2d 1 (Pa. 2000).
56
Among the Dauberts’ proffered experts were Dr. Gross, Dr. Newman, and Dr.
Done. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc (Daubert IV), 43 F.3d 1311, 1321 (9th
Cir. 1995).
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the FDA. Dr. Done testified to the chemical similarity of Doxylamine, one of the active ingredients in Bendectin, to other known
teratogens, to in vitro studies showing its detrimental effect on limb
bud cells, and to his re-analyses of two epidemiological studies which,
in his opinion, showed an increased risk of clubfeet in the infants of
58
women who took Bendectin in “the first four months of pregnancy.”
Dr. Newman testified that Doxylamine “can pass through the placen59
tal barrier” and affect the embryo. The testimony given by Dr. Stolley at the previous trial, that “there was three times the risk of malformations” in babies whose mothers “had filled more than one
60
prescription for Bendectin,” was read into evidence.
Most important here, however, is Judge Bernstein’s summary
and scathing commentary on Merrell Dow’s experts’ testimony:
Defense expert Dr. Bracken, a professor of epidemiology at Yale,
testified that his study (based on interviews with 1427 mothers, of
whom only 122 had taken Bendectin) concluded that Bendectin carried no significant risk of birth defects except for pyloric stenosis;
however, he acknowledged that it showed there was a more than twoand-a half times greater risk of birth defects in infants born to women
61
who took Bendectin and also smoked. On cross-examination, he
agreed not only that articles that are “less than good” can pass peer
review, but also that his own published study of Bendectin and birth
62
defects was itself less than good.
Defense expert Dr. Klebanoff, who began his work on Bendectin
long after the drug was taken off the market, testified that Bendectin
does not cause birth defects, but acknowledged that his own article
showed a statistically significant association with congenital cataracts,
63
underdevelopment of the lungs, and microcephaly. Under crossexamination, he agreed that Bendectin is positively associated with
64
clubbed feet.
Defense expert Dr. Tyl, a developmental toxicologist, was hired
by the federal government, again long after Bendectin had been
65
withdrawn, to perform animal studies on the drug.
She testified

57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Blum ex. rel. Blum, 33 Phila. Co. Rptr. at 202.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 206.
Id.
Id. at 207–08.
Id. at 207.
Blum ex. rel. Blum, 33 Phila. Co. Rptr. at 208–09.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 209–15.
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that “Bendectin is not a teratogen, but it is a ‘developmental toxicant,’” and that as a result of her work the drug had been placed on
the “List of Developmental Toxicants” maintained by the U.S. Government. A developmental toxicant, she explained, is defined as an
indicator of such defects as reduced “body weight, reduced survival,
increased number of variations, reduced ossification; . . . and certain
66
morphological changes.”
Defense expert Dr. Shapiro (whose formal training in epidemiology amounted only to eleven credits toward a Master’s degree) was
head of the Slone Center for Epidemiology at Boston University in a
period when the unit received over one and a half million dollars in
67
research-support funds from Merrell Dow. He testified that Bendectin could not cause birth defects. However, the data on which he
based his opinion lumped together women who took Bendectin during the period when limbs were forming, and those who took the
68
drug only after the baby’s limbs had formed. He agreed that this
resulted in an underestimate of the incidence of clubfeet in the
group exposed to Bendectin, but refused to attribute any significance
69
to this. If Bendectin did cause birth defects, he explained, his study
might have underestimated the risk; but since Bendectin does not
70
cause birth defects, his study could not have done so.
Defense expert Dr. Newberne admitted that Merrell Dow had
engaged in “a consistent pattern of underreporting” of adverse effects
of Bendectin to the FDA. He acknowledged that during the period
when a study by Dr. Smithells supposedly showing the safety of Bendectin had been rejected by the British Medical Journal, The Lancet, and
the New England Journal of Medicine, and eventually was accepted by
the much less prestigious journal Teratology, the author was actively
seeking funds from the company, writing that “[m]uch clearly depends upon the value of this publication to Merrell Dow . . . . If it
may save the company large sums of money . . . in the California
court (which is rather what I thought when we undertook this study),
71
Dr. Newberne also testified that
they may feel magnanimous.”

66

Blum ex rel. Blum, 33 Phila. Co. Rptr. at 211 n.54, rev’d, 705 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997), aff’d, 764 A.2d 1 (Pa. 2000).
67
Blum ex rel. Blum, 33 Phila. Co. Rptr. at 214 & n.69.
68
Id. at 215–17.
69
Id. at 217.
70
Id. (the record says that Dr. Shapiro was head of the Department of Epidemiology at Boston University, but Dr. Richard Clapp of the Boston University School of
Public Health tells me this is incorrect).
71
Id. at 219.
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Merrell Dow had supported Dr. Shapiro’s research at Boston Univer72
sity and Dr. Hendricks’s in California out of its legal defense funds.
Defense expert Dr. Brent, the editor of Teratology, who had been
retained as an expert by Merrell Dow for eighteen years, testified that
his only formal education in epidemiology was one course in statistics, but considered himself the world authority in “secular trend
data”—a scientific field in which, Judge Bernstein adds, there is ap73
parently only one practitioner, Dr. Brent himself. Using his editorial prerogative to sidestep peer review, he had published in his own
journal an article entitled Litigation-Produced Pain, Disease, and Suffering: An Experience with Congenital Malformation Lawsuits, which concluded, based on his review of deposition and trial transcripts, that
74
seventeen out of seventeen plaintiffs lied. He also testified that he
had submitted a draft article entitled Bendectin: The Most Comprehensively Studied Human Non-Teratogen, and the Foremost Tortogen-Litigen to
Merrell Dow’s attorneys for editing, hoping to publish it in The New
England Journal of Medicine, the Journal of the American Medical Associa75
tion, or The Lancet.
Dr. Newberne’s testimony, Judge Bernstein comments, revealed
76
“[t]he interaction of ‘scientific studies’ and litigation defense”; Dr.
Brent’s testimony clearly “revealed a sycophantic relationship be72

Id. at 221–22.
Blum ex rel. Blum, 33 Phila. Co. Rptr. at 224.
74
Robert L. Brent, Litigation-Produced Pain, Disease, and Suffering: An Experience
with Congenital Malformation Lawsuits, 16 TERATOLOGY 1, 5 (1977).
75
Blum ex rel. Blum, 33 Phila. Co. Rptr. at 225, rev’d, 705 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1997), aff’d, 764 A.2d 1 (Pa. 2000). The article in question appears to be Robert L.
Brent, Bendectin: Review of the Medical Literature of a Comprehensively Studied Human Nonteratogen and the Most Prevalent Tortogen-Litigen, 9 REPROD. TOXICOLOGY 337 (1995).
This paper prompted a lawsuit for defamation by Dr. Stuart A. Newman, whom Dr.
Brent had misquoted, against Dr. Brent and the editor of Reproductive Toxicology. At
the suggestion of the presiding judge, the parties were invited to air their differences
in a scientific forum. See Stuart A. Newman, Dr. Brent and Scientific Debate, 13 REPROD.
TOXICOLOGY 241 (1999) (complaining of the “partisan” nature of Dr. Brent's work,
which “should have raised questions about the objectivity of the peer review and editorial process,” and noting his association with the law firm of Dinsmore & Shohl,
which represented Merrell Dow in many of its Bendectin cases); Robert L. Brent, Response to Dr. Stuart Newman's Commentary on an Article Entitled “Bendectin: Review of the
Medical Literature of a Comprehensively Studied Human Nonteratogen and the Most Prevalent
Tortogen-litigen,” 13 REPROD. TOXICOLOGY 245 (1999) (pointing out that Dr. Newman's
testimony had been excluded in several Bendectin cases); Stuart A. Newman, A Response to Dr. Brent’s Commentary on “Dr. Brent and Scientific Debate,” 13 REPROD.
TOXICOLOGY 255, 256 (1999) (noting that much of Dr. Brent's response relies on
judges’ opinions regarding scientific issues); see also Robert L. Brent, Bendectin and
Birth Defects: Hopefully, the Final Chapter, 67 BIRTH DEFECTS RES. 79 (2003) (urging the
reintroduction of Bendectin as effective and harmless).
76
Blum ex rel. Blum, 33 Phila. Co. Rptr. at 222.
73
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tween Dr. Brent and the attorneys representing Merrell Dow.”
Moreover, testimony presented “clearly demonstrated that not all
‘peer review’ journals are created equal,” that “not all the articles
contained in ‘peer review’ journals were even reviewed,” and that “articles were intentionally inserted in peer review journals for use in
78
court.” But most immediately to the present purpose is Judge Bernstein’s exasperated commentary on Dr. Shapiro’s testimony: when
asked by the court whether his study underestimated the risk of Bendectin, Dr. Shapiro replied, “yes”; but immediately went on to add
that what he meant was only that, if there were a causal relationship, it
would have been underestimated, but “[i]f there were no causal relationship, which is what I believe . . . there could not have been any
79
underestimates.” “The circularity of this reasoning,” Judge Bernstein argues, makes it unmistakably clear that Dr. Shapiro was engaged in “justification science not inquisitive science”; and, he continues, “[c]learly revealed in this testimony is the unalterable
preconception from which Dr. Shapiro’s ‘scientific conclusion’ was
80
derived.” Dr. Shapiro’s conviction that Bendectin is not teratogenic
was so firm from the outset that he was virtually impervious to any
evidence that might suggest otherwise.
***
Is Bendectin teratogenic? After reading only Daubert, an intelligent, fair-minded layperson would be inclined to say: “almost certainly not.” After reading Blum, however, he might well say, as I
would: “I’m not so sure as I was; it’s all very confusing.” Maybe
Merrell Dow overstepped ethical boundaries in protecting its interests in that self-defeating way to which defendant manufacturers seem
81
prone, but maybe they really had something to hide. For someone

77

Id. at 225 (responding to Dr Brent’s claim that there was “a sycophantic alliance between the expert witness and the plaintiff’s attorney”).
78
Id. at 246–47.
79
Id. at 217.
80
Id.
81
I am thinking here, for example, of the instructions to salespeople uncovered
by Dan Bolton, attorney for Maria Stern in her 1984 case against Dow Corning alleging injuries caused by her silicone breast-implants. The incriminating memo reads,
in part:
[I]t has been observed that the new mammaries with responsive gel
have a tendency to appear oily after being manipulated. This could
prove to be a problem with your daily detailing activity. . . . You should
make plans to change demonstration samples often. Also, be sure that
samples are clean and dry before customer detailing.
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outside the relevant fields, it’s almost impossible to know. But for
someone in my field—epistemology—the tangled tale of Daubert and
Blum is just the kind of tangle to make the fingers itch.
III. AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL SWAMP: THE SINKING SANDS OF
“LITIGATION-DRIVEN” AND “EVIDENTIARY RELIABILITY”
Though, as Jonathan Rauch once observed, a good way “to clear
83
the room at a cocktail party” is to use the word “epistemology,” I
hope that in this more academic forum I may be permitted to observe
that the law is up to its neck in epistemological concepts and ques84
tions. In the present context we need to understand, at a minimum,
the difference between inquiry and advocacy; the nature of advocacy
research; the contrast between disinterestedness and bias; and the relation of all these to issues about truth and reliability.
Inquiry, investigation—the professional business of scientists,
historians, legal and literary scholars, investigative journalists, and so
forth—is a matter of trying to discover the answer to some question:
who committed the crime, what caused the cancer or made it advance so quickly, where did the money go, etc.? Advocacy, by contrast—the professional business of lobbyists, attorneys, and so on—is
a matter of trying to persuade an audience of the truth of some
proposition: that my client didn’t do it, that it was work-related PCB
exposure that promoted the tumor, that the stolen money has been
hidden in a numbered account in the Cayman Islands, etc.

MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN
THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE 59 (1996).
82
Sanders, supra note 27. Prof. Sanders’ conclusion is that the weight of the scientific work indicated that Bendectin is probably not teratogenic, but that the evidence presented to juries in Bendectin cases did not accurately represent the true
state of the science. Id. at 3. He acknowledges, however, that some in vivo studies
have shown teratogenic effects; that six epidemiological studies had found a statistically significant correlation between Bendectin and certain types of defect; that many
studies failed to pinpoint the time in pregnancy during which mothers took Bendectin; and that the presence of the suspect ingredient, Doxylamine Succinate, in two
over-the-counter drugs—Unisom and Nyquil—that some subjects may have taken
could have skewed study results. Id. at 25–26. Prof. Sanders’s description of some of
the supposedly reassuring animal-testing work undertaken by Merrell Dow in
1966–1967, in the wake of the Thalidomide disaster, also leaves one a little uneasy:
“[a]lthough their test animals suffered several defects, Newberne and Gibson did not
attribute the defects to Bendectin.” Id. at 21.
83
JONATHAN RAUCH, KINDLY INQUISITORS: THE NEW ATTACKS ON FREE THOUGHT 35
(1993).
84
Susan Haack, Epistemology Legalized: Or, Truth, Justice, and the American Way, 49
AM. J. JURIS. 43, 44 (2004).
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Magistrate Judge Breen observes in Nelson that we want expert
85
opinions to be “about science, . . . not advocacy.” That distinction is
clear enough; but the most relevant distinction here is between inquiry, investigation, real research, i.e., really trying to find the true
answer to some question, whatever that truth may be, and advocacy
research, i.e., trying to find the strongest possible evidence for the
truth of some proposition determined in advance. This, I take it, was
the distinction Judge Bernstein had in mind when he contrasted Dr.
Shapiro’s “justification science” (i.e., advocacy research) with “inquisitive science” (i.e., real research, inquiry plain and simple).
Distinguishing genuine inquiry, the real thing, from pseudoinquiry or “sham reasoning,” C.S. Peirce—a working scientist as well
as the greatest of American philosophers—wrote that “[t]he spirit . . .
is the most essential thing—the motive”; that genuine inquiry consists
in “actually drawing the bow upon truth with intentness in the eye,
86
with energy in the arm.” For the same reason, I am tempted to
write of advocacy “research” (in scare quotes); for it is something of a
stretch to call advocacy research “research” at all. Advocacy “research” is like inquiry insofar as it involves seeking out evidence. But
it is part of an advocacy project insofar as it involves seeking out evidence favoring a predetermined conclusion; and it is undertaken in
the spirit, from the motive, of an advocate. In short, it is a kind of
pseudo-inquiry.
There’s nothing wrong with advocacy, as such. There’s nothing
wrong, even, with a scientist taking on the role of advocate—even on
matters related to his own field; indeed, it might be argued that if a
medical or environmental scientist, for example, discovers a hitherto
unsuspected health risk or benefit, he has a moral obligation to bring
it to the public attention as effectively as possible. But there is something wrong with advocacy research. Investigating the risks and benefits of taking this dietary supplement or damning that river is a quite
different enterprise from advocating that the supplement be banned
or that the dam be built; and while it is highly desirable that advocacy
be based on the results of well-conducted investigation, it is highly
undesirable that advocacy be allowed to slant investigation.
Obviously enough, someone straightforwardly investigating a
question and someone engaged in advocacy research on behalf of a
85

Nelson v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., No 95-1112, 1998 WL 1297690, at *9 (W.D.
Tenn. Aug. 31, 1998).
86
CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE 1.34
(Charles Hartshorne, et. al. eds., 1931–58) (1903); id. 1.235 (1902) (references to
the COLLECTED PAPERS are by volume and paragraph number).
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particular answer take different attitudes to the evidence. The plainand-simple inquirer wants to find the answer (though the upshot may
be a realization that his question was in some way misconceived, and
when he does find an answer, he will often find himself faced with a
slew of new questions). He is motivated to seek out all the evidence
he can lay hands on, to weigh it as judiciously as possible, to assess
where it leads as carefully as he can, and to suspend judgment unless
and until his evidence warrants drawing a conclusion. An advocacy
researcher, by contrast, is motivated to seek out all the evidence that
favors his predetermined conclusion, but to ignore, play down, or
explain away any evidence contrary to that conclusion.
So, being motivated to seek out all the evidence, the plain-andsimple inquirer will be more thorough than the advocacy researcher
looking only for favorable evidence; being concerned to find the answer whatever the answer may be, he will be less partial than the advocacy researcher trying to minimize the importance of unfavorable
evidence he can neither ignore nor explain away; and, being ready to
acknowledge evidence either way, he will be more honest than the advocacy researcher trying to disguise what doesn’t suit his purpose.
This is why he is likelier than an advocacy researcher—other things
(his ability, energy, resources, etc.) being equal—to discover the
truth; the more so, the longer he inquires.
Connections with the concepts of interestedness and bias now
begin to come into focus. In one sense, to describe an inquirer as
“interested” means that he takes an interest in the question he is investigating (he isn’t bored by it or uninterested in it, nor is he just dutifully but unenthusiastically doing what is required by his job or demanded by his Ph.D. supervisor). In another and potentially more
problematic sense, it means that he has an interest in the answer to
the question coming out this way rather than that, i.e., he stands to
gain in some way from reaching this conclusion rather than a different one. And in a third sense, the most problematic, an interested
investigator is really only an “investigator”; for the way he proceeds is
distorted by his desire that the answer come out in the way by which
he stands to gain. Often, but not always or inevitably, someone who is
interested in the second sense is also interested in the third. It is the
third sense that chiefly concerns us here; for an “inquirer” who is interested in this sense is bound to be biased: that is, to lean in one direction, to play up the evidence on one side of his question and play
down anything negative. (This reveals the connection between the
two senses of “partial”: an investigator who is partial, in the sense of
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“biased toward one side of an issue,” will concentrate selectively on
evidence which is partial, in the sense of “incomplete.”)
Peirce’s prime example of sham reasoning was the “seminary
philosophy” dominant in his day. Theologians, he argued, being professionally committed to the truth of certain propositions, are professionally obliged to adjust their philosophical arguments so as to pre87
serve and support those propositions. So perhaps it is no wonder
that a prime contemporary example that comes to my mind is the
“research” offered by its proponents in favor of Intelligent Design
Theory. So far as I can see, this amounts only to efforts, often
88
botched, and sometimes apparently outright dishonest, to identify
“gaps and problems” in the theory of evolution, and to cover up the
much more formidable gaps and problems in Intelligent Design
89
Theory. Judge Jones’s unremittingly commonsense analysis in Kitzmiller—noting that even some of the expert witnesses for the defendant school district acknowledge that there is no real scientific research supporting Intelligent Design Theory—does a pretty good job
90
of unmasking this sham reasoning.
Of course, the real world is always much messier than philosophers would like. Rather than a simple division into genuine and
pseudo-inquiry, honest and dishonest inquirers, we find more and
less plain-and-simple investigation, and just about every degree and
91
shade of intellectual honesty and dishonesty. The categorical dis87

Id. at 1.620 (1898).
For example, the Intelligent Design biology text, PERCIVAL DAVIS & DEAN
KENYON, OF PANDAS AND PEOPLE 104 (3d ed. 1993), stresses the absence of transitional
fossils of creatures between fishes and amphibians, and the large differences between
the two. But when in 2006 scientists discovered the fossil remains of the 375 millionyear-old crocodile-headed giant fish, the tiktaalik, which appears to have been precisely such a transitional creature, a spokesperson for the Discovery Institute, which
has been aggressively promoting Intelligent Design Theory, professed unconcern:
“few leading [Intelligent Design] researchers have argued against the existence of
transitional forms.” John Noble Wilford, Fossil Called Missing Link from Sea to Land
Animals, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2006, at A1; If It Walks Like a Fish . . . , NEWSWEEK, Apr. 27,
2007, at 8.
89
See SUSAN HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE—WITHIN REASON: BETWEEN SCIENTISM AND
CYNICISM, at X–XIII, 272–82 (paperback ed. 2007); Susan Haack, Fallibilism and Faith,
Naturalism and the Supernatural, Science and Religion, in PUTTING PHILOSOPHY TO WORK:
INQUIRY AND ITS PLACE IN CULTURE 183 (2008).
90
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005); see also
EDWARD HUMES, MONKEY GIRL: EVOLUTION, EDUCATION, AND THE BATTLE FOR
AMERICA’S SOUL (2007) (telling the story of the Kitzmiller trial, including Eric Rothschild’s devastating cross-examination of Michael Behe, expert witness for the defendant school district).
91
In Arthur Hailey’s novel, Strong Medicine (1984)—clearly based on the Bendectin saga, but telling the story of a fictional drug company, Felding-Roth, and its fic88
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tinction between genuine inquiry and advocacy research with which I
have been working thus far, while agreeably neat and tidy conceptually, isn’t adequate to the complexities of real life; it needs to be reconstrued as identifying the two extremes of a continuum. No investigator can approach his question free of any preconceptions
whatever; most investigators have some preconception of the expected upshot from the beginning—though those who really want
the truth will change their minds should the evidence demand it; and
even the most honest and single-minded investigator is vulnerable to
that very natural tendency to duck, resist, or conveniently forget evidence that pulls against the view he has previously defended in print,
or against his fond hope that this, finally, will be the key to finding a
92
vaccine, and so on. Figuring things out can be really hard, and the
temptation to cut corners is ever-present.
So Intelligent Design “research” is only one example among
many, for the sad fact is that inquiry that is not quite plain-andsimple, less than perfectly honest, tainted, if not by outright dishonesty, by convenient self-deception, is ubiquitous. We are all only too
familiar with the phenomenon of the “Public Inquiry” the purpose of
which is to reassure the public that there is no real danger, or that
the corruption is all the fault of one junior official; with the “Customer Survey” the purpose of which is to fish for favorable material
the publicity department can use; with the “departmental review” the
purpose of which is to get friends from outside to endorse the faculty’s grandiose hopes for expansion. We are all aware, also, that in
many disciplines—economics, public health, the environmental sciences, to mention just a few—the pressures to nudge inquiry in the
direction of advocacy are subtle, and the boundary easily transgressed. And we all know that, even in the disciplines furthest removed from policy or practice, academics often succumb to the
temptation to divert energy from finding out what they can, or from
tional morning-sickness drug, Montayne—one fictional scientist, Martin Peat-Smith,
is a paradigm of the honest inquirer, and another, Vincent Lord, of the self-deceived
advocacy researcher. See also Susan Haack, The Ideal of Intellectual Integrity, in Life and
Literature, 36 NEW LITERARY HIST., 359 (2005), reprinted in Haack, supra note 89, at
195–208.
92
Sinclair Lewis's novel, Arrowsmith (1924), conveys the point: Martin Arrowsmith
destroys the integrity of his test of a vaccine by giving it, out of sympathy with their
suffering and hope of curing them, to all those who have been exposed. John Berry's
historical study, The Great Influenza (2004), illustrates it: scientists desperate to find a
vaccine ignored evidence that influenza is not bacterial; only Oswald Avery patiently
held out. Dr. Brent, whom we encountered in Blum, seems to have been motivated in
part by the fear that, with Bendectin off the market, physicians would have no effective treatment for a potentially serious condition.
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seriously thinking things through, into efforts to promote their area,
their line, or their clique.
There are many kinds of advocacy research, and many sources of
bias: some advocacy researchers are too concerned to arrive at a result favorable to a sponsor; some are over-anxious to find a cure
quickly; some are too protective of a pet approach or theory, or too
deferential to an idea endorsed by a hero of their profession; some
get careless out of concern over global warming or pollution, or etc.;
some want to reach politically-correct conclusions potentially beneficial to their careers, or to avoid reaching politically-incorrect conclusions potentially damaging to their careers; and many are simply too
certain they are right—and so feel entirely justified in suppressing
apparently unfavorable evidence which, as they see it, can only be
93
misleading.
***
To describe research as “litigation-driven” may mean either (a)
that the need for this work arises out of litigation, or (b) that the
work is undertaken for the purpose of finding evidence favoring one
side in litigation, and explaining away or otherwise playing down evidence favoring the other side. Research which is litigation-driven in
sense (a) may, but need not, also be litigation-driven in sense (b).
Research which is litigation-driven in the first sense is not peculiarly
susceptible to bias merely by virtue of being, in this sense, litigationdriven. But research which is litigation-driven in the second sense is
(one kind of) advocacy research; and so, if my analysis is correct, is
inherently in danger of bias.
This danger is mitigated somewhat if advocacy research rests on
science which has non-judicial as well as judicial uses, but it is not
completely averted. Think of DNA identifications: the underlying
93

William McBride, the Australian physician who first drew attention to the teratogenic effects of Thalidomide, was apparently so distressed at the delay before his
warnings about Thalidomide were heeded that when, subsequently, he began to suspect Bendectin (sold in Australia under the name "Debendox") of causing birth defects, he resorted to fraud in his study of pregnant rabbits given the related anticholinergic Scopolamine. Before the fraud was revealed, Dr. McBride had testified
for the plaintiffs in seventeen Bendectin cases. Sanders, supra note 23, at 36. See A.
Skolnick, Key Witness Against Morning Sickness Drug Faces Scientific Fraud Charges, 263 J.
AM. MED. ASS’N 1468 (1990); G.F. Humphrey, Scientific Fraud: The McBride Case, 32
MED. SCI. L. 199 (1992); G.F. Humphrey, Scientific Fraud: The McBride Case—Judgment,
34 MED. SCI. L. 299 (1994). Scopolamine is now marketed in the form of a patch as
an anti-nausea drug, under the name “Transderm Scop.” RXList.com, Clinical
Pharmacology, http://www.rxlist.com/cgi/generic2/transscop_cp.htm (last visited
Feb. 20, 2006).

HAACK_FINAL_V2

1076

6/12/2008 11:46:36 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1053

theoretical principles are deeply interconnected with a whole range
of other areas of well-established science, and these techniques are
used, for example, to identify disaster victims as well as to identify the
perpetrators of crimes. The theory is about as solid as scientific theory gets. But it’s not the underlying principles that are disputed at
trial; courts are not (by now, anyway) trying to determine whether
these principles are sound, but whether they have been reliably applied in this instance. There is plenty of room for bias to creep into
the application of even the soundest science.
Research may be prompted by the needs of a particular case,
or class of cases; or it may be prompted, not by cases already ongoing,
but by the fear that there will, or may, be litigation. Moreover, there
is very often more than one motive for conducting research, which
may, for example, be intended to make the case for FDA approval, to
be useful for marketing purposes, and to provide protection against
possible litigation. Obviously enough, besides the hope of prevailing
in litigation, some of these other motives—the marketing-oriented,
for example—are also likely to introduce bias.
Since Daubert gives this concept a crucial role, we also need to
give some thought to what it means to describe scientific testimony as
“reliable.” Merriam-Webster’s definition is: “suitable or fit to be relied
94
on[;] . . . giving the same results in successive trials”; the Oxford English Dictionary’s is: “may be relied upon, of sound & consistent charac95
ter or quality.” Unless it is intended to be read disjunctively, Webster’s definition seems a little odd, for the second clause seems to
allow that a procedure or technique may be reliable even though it
usually gives false results, provided it does so consistently—which
hardly seems compatible with fitness to be relied on. (A weighing
machine that consistently takes fifty pounds off a person’s real
weight, or a clock that runs perfectly but was set to the wrong time to
begin with, are not, in the ordinary sense of the term, reliable;
though I suppose you might describe them as, though “off,” at least
reliably off.) The Oxford English Dictionary’s definition, by virtue of its
reference to the “soundness” of the results, is closer to my understanding of the word.
Not unexpectedly, however, the legal concept of reliability articulated in Daubert diverges somewhat from the ordinary sense; as
Justice Blackmun’s phrase “evidentiary reliability” signals, it is a spe-

94
95

MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1051 (11th ed. 2003).
THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 1028 (4th ed. 1959).
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cialized legal concept. It is also far from transparent. Justice Blackmun writes:
We note that scientists typically distinguish between “validity”
(does the principle support what it purports to show?) and “reliability” (does application of the principle produce consistent results?). Although “the difference between accuracy, validity, and
reliability may be such that each is distinct from the other by no
more than a hen’s kick,” our reference here is to evidentiary reliability—that is, trustworthiness. In a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity. 96

This tells us that the legal or “evidentiary” concept of reliability is
to be tied to scientific “validity,” not to scientific “reliability”; which
seems to mean, in part, that yielding consistent results (which is Justice Blackmun’s understanding of “scientific reliability”) is not
enough. The reference to “trustworthiness” points in the same direction: “evidentiary reliability” requires scientific testimony to be based
on methods and processes that yield “sound,” and not merely consistent, results. But Justice Blackmun’s understanding of “sound” is apparently quite modest; it does not require that the principle on which
expert testimony is based yield true or even probably true results, but
97
only that “the principle support[s] what it purports to show.”
The fact that research is litigation-driven in the stronger sense, I
have argued, makes it likely to be biased. Biased research doesn’t
necessarily produce false results; nor does it necessarily produce false
results more often than true. After all, the proposition(s) toward
which it is slanted may be true; and when there is biased research on
both sides of a legal case, if the propositions on each side genuinely
contradict each other, the proposition(s) toward which one side’s research is slanted must be true. But biased research tends toward the
predetermined conclusion irrespective of where the evidence points;
the results it produces don’t depend on where the evidence really
leads. So if this is, as it seems to be, a reasonable interpretation of the
Daubert Court’s “evidentiary reliability,” then, indeed, biased research
is unreliable in the relevant sense.

96

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert III), 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9
(1993) (citations omitted). The internal quotation is from James Starrs, Frye v.
United States Restructured and Revitalized: A Proposal to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence
703, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 249, 256 (1986).
97
Daubert III, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9.
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IV. THROUGH THE THICKET, OUT OF THE
SWAMP, AND ONTO THE HIGH ROAD? NOT YET!
So there is some foundation for Judge Bernstein’s strictures
against “justification science”; indeed, his observation that Dr.
Shapiro’s work seems to have been based on an “unalterable preconception” that Bendectin was harmless closely parallels the argument
here, that science that is litigation-driven in the stronger sense fails to
meet Justice Blackmun’s standard of evidentiary reliability because
the conclusions drawn are not sensitive to the evidence in the way
they ought to be. And, again provided that “litigation-driven” is understood in the stronger sense, there is some foundation, also, for
Judge Kozinski’s conclusion that the fact that testimony is based on
litigation-driven research speaks negatively to its (evidentiary) reliability.
However, there is something amiss with Judge Kozinski’s arguments for that conclusion. His first argument, remember, is that science flowing from existing research is less likely to be biased toward a
particular conclusion by the promise of remuneration; this is true,
but it proves much more than he intends. Many studies confirm that
company-sponsored research into drugs or medical devices is significantly more likely than independent research to be favorable to the
98
sponsor’s product; but this suggests, not just that litigation-driven
science may be below par, but also that marketing-oriented science
should also be regarded with suspicion.
Moreover, this first argument also undermines the exception
Judge Kozinski makes with regard to evidence from the forensic sciences. It is true, as he says, that the fact that forensic scientists acquire their expertise for the purposes of the justice system isn’t in itself grounds for doubting the reliability of their testimony; but this is
not enough to establish his point. Perhaps the thought implicit here
is that forensic science is litigation-driven only in the weaker, less
troubling sense: that while it is needed only because there are crimes
to be solved and prosecuted, it is not inherently motivated by the desire to make one side of a case; but this is Pollyannish to say the least.
After all, such work is undertaken almost exclusively for the police or

98
See e.g., Richard A. Davidson, Source of Funding and Outcome of Clinical Trials, 1
J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 155 (1986); Paula Rochon et al., A Study of ManufacturerSupported Trials of Non-Steroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs in the Treatment of Arthritis, 154
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 157 (1994); Lee S. Friedman & Elihu D. Richter, Relationship
Between Conflict of Interest and Research Results, 19 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 51 (2004).
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99

prosecution; and it seems likely that forensic scientists’ and technicians’ understandable but inappropriate desire to be helpful, to find
something to make a case against a suspect, sometimes biases their
judgment. Or perhaps the thought is that forensic experts will curb
their biases because they know they will be called on to testify on nu100
merous other occasions; but this seems no less doubtful. After all,
the fact that expert witnesses in tort cases are “repeat testifiers” or
“professional expert witnesses,” as we say pejoratively, is often seen,
101
Judge Bernnot without reason, as grounds for distrusting them.
stein’s worry that “general acceptance in the field to which it be102
longs” is a poor indicator of reliability if the consensus is an artificial one is also relevant here; for in some areas of forensic science
there is a real danger that a supposed “scientific consensus” has been

99

See e.g. William C. Thompson, A Sociological Perspective on the Science of Forensic
DNA Testing, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1113, 1114 (1997).
The primary clients of the vast majority of forensic scientists are law enforcement agencies. Most forensic scientists are employed directly by
law enforcement agencies. Their role in litigation is typically, and often exclusively, to provide evidence in support of criminal prosecutions. Forensic scientists who work in private laboratories may occasionally be employed by criminal defense lawyers. However, the bulk
of their work is for law enforcement as well. The major market for
commercial laboratories that develop new technology for forensic testing also consists of law enforcement personnel.
Id.
100
Dr. Thompson (the author of the article in note 99, supra) tells me that this is
the reason Judge Kozinski gave him.
101
In the first Blum trial, the court prevented the plaintiff’s attorneys from referring to the fact that Merrell Dow’s experts had testified in other Bendectin trials.
Appendix 6, Order and Opinion of Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, May 12,
1988, at 28 (D’Alessandro, J.) (on file with author). Judge Kozinski himself suggests
that the fact that the Dauberts’ proffered experts have been testifying in Bendectin
cases all over the country is reason to be suspicious of them. Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc. (Daubert IV), 43 F. 3d 1311, 1314 (9th Cir. 1995). In fact, there were
numerous repeat testifiers on both sides throughout the Bendectin litigation. Sanders, supra note 45, at 36. Cf. Chaulk v. Volkswagen of Am. Inc., 808 F.2d 639, 644
(7th Cir. 1986) (Posner J., dissenting) (writing that an expert’s testimony was either
the work of
a crank, or, what is more likely, of a man who is making a career out of
testifying for plaintiffs in automobile accident cases in which a door
may have opened; at the time of trial he was involved in 10 such cases.
His testimony illustrates the age-old problem of expert witnesses who
are “often the mere paid advocates or partisans of those who employ or
pay them.”
(quoting Keegan v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R., 78 N.W. 965, 966 (Minn. 1899)).
102
Blum ex rel. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 33 Phila. Co. Rptr. 193, 256
(Ct. Comm. Pleas Pa. 1996).
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generated by a kind of guild or trade union of mutually supportive
103
practitioners with an interest in protecting their livelihoods.
Judge Kozinski’s second argument, that litigation-driven science
is not, like university science, kept up to the mark by the need to attract funding and institutional support, rests on a false premise. For
by now a significant proportion of the medical research in universities is not truly independent, but is sponsored by drug companies and
104
such (and a significant proportion of research in the social sciences
is in one way or another politically motivated). And in combination
with the first argument, this suggests that there may be reason to
doubt the reliability of such university science, as well as science specifically undertaken to support one side or another in litigation, or to
provide data that can be used in marketing.
Moreover, the peer-review process for funding and publication,
on which Judge Kozinski puts quite a lot of weight, is a frail safeguard
at best. Even if all the work published in peer-review journals were
peer-reviewed—which it isn’t—this would be only very weak assurance of its reliability. As the Daubert Court’s comments on “peerreview and publication” obliquely acknowledge, it is not peerreviewed publication as such that indicates reliability, but the longrun survival of published results on which other scientists find they
105
can build successfully.
Still, given that, as I have argued, there is merit in the idea that
the fact that science is litigation-driven in the stronger sense indicates
that it is likely to be unreliable, in something like the sense Justice
Blackmun explained in Daubert, might this not be a helpful factor to
be added to his list of indicia of (un)reliability? Unfortunately, matters are not so simple; for the sad fact—obvious once you think about
it—is that there can be no simple, mechanically applicable test that
would accurately discriminate strong science from weak. The Daubert
Court observes that its list of indicia of reliability is “flexible,” and
can’t simply be applied mechanically. And a mechanical application
of Judge Kozinski’s new Daubert factor would certainly be as ill-advised
103
See e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux & Michael J. Saks, Brave New
“Post-Daubert World”—A Reply to Professor Moenssens, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 405
(1998). The knife-mark examiners in Ramirez v. State, 542 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1989),
Ramirez v. State, 651 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1995), and Ramirez v. State, 810 So. 2d 836 (Fla.
2001) illustrate the problem.
104
See e.g., SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST(2003); Marcia Angell, Is Scientific Medicine for Sale?, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1516 (2000).
105
Brief for Chubin et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (No. 92-102). See also Susan Haack,
Peer Review and Publication: Lessons for Lawyers, 36 STETSON L. REV. 789 (2007).

HAACK_FINAL_V2

2008]

6/12/2008 11:46:36 AM

LITIGATION-DRIVEN SCIENCE

1081

as a mechanical application of a requirement that testimony be based
on research that has been published in peer-reviewed journals—and
for structurally similar reasons: “peer-reviewed” and “litigationdriven” both have (a) a readily-applicable sense that has little to do
with reliability, and (b) a subtler sense which bears more closely on
reliability but isn’t readily applicable. “Published after peer review” is
easily applied, but it is a frail indicator of reliability; “has been out
there long enough, has been read by enough others knowledgeable
enough in the field, links up in an explanatory way with enough
other bits of scientific theorizing, and has proven robust enough
when new experiments or theoretical work assume its reliability” is a
much better indicator of reliability, but it is much more difficult to
106
apply. Similarly, “undertaken in the course of or in anticipation of
litigation” is easily applied, but a frail indicator of reliability; “skewed
by the desire to advance one side in litigation” indicates unreliability,
all right, but is much more difficult to apply.
***
I haven’t forgotten that the epistemological rationale for the adversarial system is that having rival advocates each present the evidence favoring their side of a case is a good way to ensure, so far as
possible, that the truth comes out. As I have argued elsewhere, the
best argument that could be made for the epistemological efficacy of
such a system would run something like this:
Since for good reasons the legal process, unlike the process of
scientific inquiry, has to be concluded within a relatively short
time frame, we need a way of ensuring that the search for and
scrutiny of evidence is as thorough as that time frame allows. An
adversarial system is one way to do this. If everyone involved
knows that eventually, at the trial stage, the determination will be
made by an impartial jury weighing the evidence developed and
presented by the parties, each subject to cross-examination by the
other, this should encourage precisely the kind of thoroughness
we are aiming to achieve. For an advocate’s goal is to win; so
counsel for each party is motivated to seek out evidence favoring
his side of the case, and to bring out the flaws in evidence pointing the other way. To be sure, the process isn’t perfect; but it is a
107
reasonable substitute for the ideal.

106
107

See Haack, supra note 105.
Haack, supra note 84, at 51.
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This is a good argument—in principle; however, it is a serious
question how well it applies to our adversarial system, as that functions in practice.
A quite general problem is that there is often a vast asymmetry
between the resources available to one side in litigation and those
available to the other. And where scientific testimony is concerned
there are further problems as well. In 1901, Judge Learned Hand
complained that the expert-witness system “set[s] juries to decide,
108
where doctors disagree”;
more than a century later, Justice
Rehnquist and Judge Kozinski complain, in effect, that now it “set[s]
109
The fact is that judges,
judges to decide, where doctors disagree.”
jurors, or attorneys, however conscientious and thorough, probably
don’t fully understand scientific testimony; to make matters worse,
the more an area of science gets entangled with litigation, the more
scientists in that area seem (like Dr. Brent and Dr. Newman) to fall
into advocacy mode. And this makes the difficult business of getting
at the truth of the questions at issue even harder than it would otherwise be—which is presumably what Justice Castille had in mind when
he expressed concern about “the litigation-driven Bendectin ‘scien110
tific community’ described to the court” in Blum .
In the criminal justice system, besides a troubling asymmetry between the scientific resources ordinarily available to the defense and
those available to the prosecution, there seem to be grounds for concern both that, in some areas of forensic science, a self-serving guild
mentality may predominate over the scientific attitude, and that
courts are reluctant to reconsider their long-standing reliance on
identification techniques such as fingerprinting (about the reliability
111
of which much is claimed, but little seems to be known) or psychi108
Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony,
15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 54 (1901).
109
“I do not doubt that Rule 702 confides to the judge some gatekeeping responsibility in deciding questions of the admissibility of proffered expert testimony. But I
do not think it imposes on them either the obligation or the authority to become
amateur scientists in order to perform that role.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,
Inc. (Daubert III), 509 U.S. 579, 600–01 (1993) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). “[W]e are
largely untrained in science and certainly no match for any of the witnesses whose
testimony we are reviewing.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert IV), 43
F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995).
110
Blum ex rel. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 764 A.2d 1, 13–14 (Pa. 2000).
111
See, e.g., Simon Cole, What Counts for Identity? The Historical Origins of the Methodology of Latent Fingerprint Identification, 12 SCI. CONTEXT 139 (1999); Robert Epstein,
Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint “Science” is Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV.
605 (2002); Jennifer Mnookin, Fingerprints: Not a Gold Standard, ISSUES SCI. & TECH.,
Fall 2003, at 47; Simon Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility from
Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1189 (2004); Sharon Be-
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atric techniques such as predictions of future dangerousness.
And
in the civil arena, toxic-tort and product-liability litigation seems like
a kind of lottery, where it is hard to feel confident either that all and
only those plaintiffs who really were injured by defendants’ products
are compensated, or that the system provides effective incentives to
manufacturers to investigate their products as thoroughly as possible.
In any case, while compensating the victims of dangerous products after the damage has been done, insofar as such compensation is
possible, is better than nothing, it is hardly the ideal. It would be better, surely, to ensure so far as humanly possible that safe and beneficial drugs, devices, chemicals, etc., are available, but dangerous or
damaging drugs, etc., are kept off the market, or taken off the market
as soon as the dangers are known, and that manufacturers are discouraged from hiding or disguising risks posed by their products.
Policy proposals are not exactly a philosopher’s forte, but I will venture to ask some of the tough questions that the story of Daubert and
Blum prompts in my mind. Do we rely too much on what Justice
113
Breyer describes as “the powerful engine of tort litigation,” ideally
the last resort? Are other technologically advanced countries where
the engine of tort litigation is less powerful, invariably less successful,
also, in keeping beneficial products on, and dangerous products off
the market? Are other countries’ regulatory agencies more effective,
and if so, why? Might some of the energy now devoted to discussions
of how best to fine-tune the rules of admissibility of expert testimony
be more profitably diverted to thinking about other and possibly better ways to approximate the ideal more closely? And (perhaps you
will think this a naïve question, but I’ll ask it anyway): what if the
time, energy, intelligence, and resources spent on cases like Daubert
and Blum had been spent instead on independent, honest, solid scientific investigation of the factual issues?

gley, Despite Its Reputation, Fingerprint Evidence Isn’t Really Infallible, WALL ST. J., June 4,
2004, at B1.
112
See, e.g., Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Hill, Genetic Predictions of Future
Dangerousness: Is There a Blueprint for Violence?, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 201 (2006);
Thomas Regnier, Barefoot in Quicksand: The Future of Future Dangerousness Predictions in
Death Penalty Sentencing in the World of Daubert and Kumho, 37 AKRON L. REV. 467
(2004).
113
Justice Breyer writes that courts’ gatekeeping can help ensure that “the powerful engine of tort liability, which can generate strong financial incentives to reduce,
or eliminate production, points towards the right substances and does not destroy
the wrong ones.” G.E. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring). Of course, it spoils the effect somewhat that the substance in question in the
case was PCBs (polychlorinated biphenals), so dangerous that they have been
banned since 1978!

